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THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, AND 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
Albert]. Rosenthal* 
ALTHOUGH Alexander Hamilton characterized the method pro-vided in the Constitution for the selection of the President as 
"almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has 
escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest 
mark of approbation from its opponents,"1 its critics soon made up 
for lost time, and it has probably been the subject of more proposed 
amendments than any other provision of the Constitution.2 Recent 
years have seen an intensification of interest in the subject, reflecting 
both widespread concern that a President might be chosen who 
was not the leader in popular votes and fear over the dangers of a 
stolen or stalemated election. This heightened attention may have 
sprung in part from the near crises of 1948 and 1960,3 but un-
doubtedly it has also been influenced by the rapid growth in the 
power and significance of the presidency itself. Evidence for this 
may be seen in the fact that of the last six constitutional amendments 
adopted, five have concerned the presidency in whole or in part.4 
• Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1938, University of Pennsylvania; 
LL.B. 1941, Harvard University.-Ed. 
The author gratefully acknowledges critical suggestions from Professors Louis 
Henkin and Alfred Hill, and extensive research assistance from Larry S. Gibson, Esq., 
of the Maryland Bar and the Class of 1967, Mr. Bennett H. Last of the Class of 
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Since this Article was in page proofs before November 5, it has been possible to 
make only minor changes to reflect the results of the most recent presidential election. 
The author believes, however, that none of the points made herein need be qualified 
in response to that election. 
I. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 508 CT• Hamilton ed. 1868) (Hamilton). 
2. Through 1966, 513 resolutions proposing amendments to the provisions of the 
Constitution pertaining to the election of the President were introduced in Congress. 
N. PEIRCE, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT 151 (1968) [hereinafter PEIRCE]. 
!I. In both of these close elections, a shift of only a few thousand votes in certain 
key states would have prevented either major party candidate from obtaining a ma-
jority of the electoral votes; a "Dixiecrat" candidate would have held the balance of 
power. The election would then have been referred to the House of Representatives, 
in which the delegation from each state would have cast one vote, and a majority of 
all the states would have been required for election. In each instance, the House was 
closely enough divided that a stalemate might well have ensued. See page 15 infra. 
There is some doubt as to whether demonstration of the shortcomings of the system 
in a recent election is in itself sufficient to induce a change. In five successive elections 
from 1876 through 1892, the winning candidate failed to obtain a majority of the 
popular vote; in two of them the popular leader lost; in all five an infinitesimal shift 
of votes would have reversed the result; and in one (1876) a national crisis was 
narrowly averted. Yet the Constitution was not amended. While some modern ob-
servers might conclude that the quality of the candidates in those elections was such 
that it mattered little who won, it is unlikely that the people of the time so regarded it. 
4. The twentieth amendment changed the President's term of office and provided 
for the death of the President-elect or his failure to qualify. The twenty-second amend-
ment limited the President to two terms; the twenty-third provided for representation 
[I] 
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Still, the basic method of electing the President has continued almost 
without change. 
While a wide variety of amendments intended to remove various 
apparent shortcomings in the method of selecting our Presidents 
have been proposed over the years, the current drive is centered on 
the proposal to employ a direct, nationwide, popular vote. This 
would eliminate the possibility that the popular favorite might be de-
feated, as was Grover Cleveland in 1888, by an opponent with fewer 
popular but more electoral votes. If coupled with a provision that 
less than a majority of the popular votes (for example, 40 per cent) 
would suffice for election, or that a runoff election would be held 
if no candidate obtained a required percentage,5 this proposal would 
defeat the strategy of regional third-party candidates who seek to 
deprive either major party candidate of a majority of electoral votes 
and to throw the election into the House of Representatives where a 
stalemate could easily result. Finally, a direct popular vote would 
also prevent the "theft" of an election by the action of presidential 
electors defying the mandate of the voters who had selected them 
on the assumption that they would support their party's nominees. 
It is not surprising that this proposal has garnered widespread 
support. It has been recommended by a prestigious commission of 
the American Bar Association6 and endorsed by the ABA's House 
of Delegates. The Bar Association of the City of New York, 
which had previously recommended a different proposed amend-
ment, 7 has now shifted its support to direct popular vote, 8 as has 
Senator Birch Bayh, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.9 A 
of the District of Columbia in the electoral college; the twenty-fourth eliminated the 
poll tax in elections for the President and Congress; and the twenty-fifth provided for 
the disability of the President and the designation of a Vice President when that 
office is vacant. 
Fortunately, few of our recent Presidents have been either drunkards or teetotalers; 
hence the twenty-first amendment, repealing Prohibition, cannot be viewed as bearing 
with any particular emphasis on the presidency. 
5. For example, S.J. Res. 2, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), introduced by Senator Bayh 
and a bipartisan group of 18 other senators. See also the recommendations of the 
A.B.A. Commission, infra note 6. 
6. ABA COMMN. ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM, ELECTING THE PRESIDENT (1967). 
See also Feerick, The Electoral College-Why It Ought To Be Abolished, 37 FORDHAM 
L. REv. I (1968). 
7. The amendment which had been supported by the Association provided for 
automatic award of the electoral votes of each state to the candidate securing a 
plurality of the popular vote therein, eliminating the presidential electors as such. 
See 20 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 503 (1965); text accompanying note 125 infra. 
8. 6 REPs. OF COMM. CONCERNED WITH FEDERAL LEGISLATION, Assoc. OF THE BAR OF 
THE CITY OF N.Y. 9 (1967). 
9. See note 5 supra; Hearings on S. ]. Res. 4 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 90th Cong., 
1st Sess., 245-46 (1968). 
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Gallup poll indicates that 66 per cent of the nation supports this 
amendment, with only 19 per cent opposed.10 
It must be remembered, however, that a decision to amend the 
Constitution is, as a practical matter, usually an irreversible step.11 
It is the purpose of this Article to examine the gravity of the evils 
sought to be eliminated, the possibility that the proposed amend-
ment might give rise to undesirable side effects, and the avail-
ability of alternative remedies. 
1. DEFEAT OF THE POPULAR CHOICE 
We still choose our chief magistrate by a method which is both 
anachronistic and undemocratic. There is much that is attractive 
in the view that the President should be chosen by a completely 
democratic process-that if the principle of "one man-one vote" 
has validity elsewhere it ought to be applied here. For a nation pro-
fessing dedication to democratic ideals, the selection of its most im-
portant officer through a method not completely democratic must, 
inevitably, be a source of dissatisfaction. And under any system in 
which the presidency is determined by some method other than 
direct popular vote, there is necessarily a possibility that the popular 
favorite may not win. 
There are, however, difficulties with a completely democratic 
selection process both in principle and practicality. As an abstract 
proposition, complete equality of influence of every voter in the 
country might well be a worthy goal. But we are not living under 
an abstract proposition. In other parts of the real system under 
which we live, voters do not always have equal influence: compare 
the Senate. The way in which the President is chosen must be con-
sidered in the context of the entire governmental structure rather 
than in isolation. Moreover, since there is no real possibility of 
achieving total equality in every component of our political life, 
it may be particularly pertinent to consider the desirability of 
direct popular election of the President in terms of practical con-
sequences as well as democratic theory. What forces in our society 
would be strengthened, and what weakened, if the change were 
made? Which needs would be likely to be served and which put 
aside? 
The Founding Fathers, of course, did not contemplate a purely 
democratic procedure for choosing the President. The device se-
lected was the product of a compromise between those favoring and 
IO. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1968, at 61, col. 2. 
I I. Constitutional amendments are difficult to pass. The provisions of the original 
Constitution are seldom changed; amendments, by hypothesis more nearly contempo• 
rary, are even more difficult to alter once adopted. Only one, the eighteenth, has ever 
been repealed. 
4 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:1 
those opposing popular participation in the choice;12 it also reflected 
an earlier compromise between the large and the small states as 
to congressional representation.13 Even the right to vote for presi-
dential electors was not assured, since each state could "appoint" 
its electors as it saw fit. In fact, in some states-South Carolina until 
186014-the legislatures retained this power. 
The original constitutional framework has, with minor ex-
ceptions, 15 remained unchanged to this day; yet, as a practical mat-
ter the manner of presidential selection evolved very quickly into 
a form which would have been unrecognizable to the Framers. With 
the growth of political parties, the elector soon became a mere 
functionary expected to vote for his party's candidates.16 And with 
the advance of democracy, each state eventually directed that its 
electors be chosen by universal suffrage. However, the electors are 
still chosen on a state-by-state basis, and in turn, they elect the 
President.17 
When the voters first began choosing electors, many states were 
divided into electoral districts with the result that if party strength 
differed from district to district a mixed delegation of electors was 
chosen. A few states, however, employed statewide balloting, and 
the party that prevailed in total vote secured the entire electoral 
count. This device enabled a state to achieve an influence far greater 
than a state whose electoral vote was divided; by a sort of Gresham's 
Law, the states in the latter group felt obliged, in self-defense, to 
12. See, e.g., 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
132, 166 (1937); L. WILMERDING, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 19-22 (1958); Roche, The 
Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL. Sex. REv. 799, 810-11 (1961); 
cf. Kirby, Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Elections, 27 
LAw & CoNTEMP, PROB. 495, 506 (1962); Truman, Book Review, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 838, 
840 (1959). See also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376 n.8 (1963): "The electoral college 
was designed by men who did not want the election of the President to be left to 
the people.'' 
13. PEIRCE 35-37. 
14. In 1876 Colorado, just admitted to the Union and perhaps lacking sufficient 
time to provide for elections, chose its electors by legislative appointment. 
15. Article I, section 2, provided that each elector vote for two persons; the one 
with the greatest number of votes (if a majority) became President and the next 
highest Vice President. Following the election of 1800, when all Democratic electors 
voted for both Jefferson and Burr causing a tie which had to be resolved in the 
House of Representatives, the twelfth amendment was adopted providing for separate 
balloting for President and Vice President and making several other minor changes. 
The fourteenth, fifteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and 
twenty-fifth amendments have all had some bearing on the process of selecting the 
President but have not changed the basic mechanical structure set forth in article II, 
section I, as amended by the twelfth amendment. 
16. J. DOUGHERTY, THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 17-18 (1906). 
17. Since the electors meet in each of the state capitals, "electoral college" (not a 
constitutional phrase) in the singnlar is a misnomer. A single deliberative body was 
never contemplated. 
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follow suit. Before long, the statewide or "general ticket" method 
became universal, and it has seldom been departed from in the 
last century.18 
Thus, as the system now operates in practice, the candidate 
obtaining a plurality19-however small-of a state's popular votes 
receives its entire complement of electoral votes. A candidate carrying 
a number of states by small margins can therefore prevail over his 
opponent whose total popular vote may be greater. Although this 
has seldom happened, the possibility cannot be ignored. 
Three elections are often cited as examples of the defeat of 
the popular favorite-those of 1824, 1876, and 1888. In 1824, the 
two-party system had temporarily broken down, and all four can-
didates-Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, William H. Craw-
ford, and Henry Clay-were, nominally at least, Democrats. No 
candidate received either a majority of the electoral vote or a major-
ity of the popular vote in the eighteen (out of twenty-four) states in 
18. In 1892, the Michigan legislature, controlled by Democrats, correctly foresaw a 
statewide victory by the Republican presidential candidate and sought to salvage 
something for his Democratic opponent by dividing the state into separate electoral 
districts. This was challenged, but sustained by the Supreme Court in McPherson v. 
Blacker, 146 U.S. I (1892). In 1896 Michigan reverted to the general ticket method. 
19. Georgia requires a majority, rather than a mere plurality, of the popular vote, to 
elect presidential electors. In the event of a failure of any slate to attain a majority, 
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1514 (Supp. 196'7) calls for a run-off between "the two candidates 
receiving the highest number of votes." This provision, applicable to other offices as 
well, would seem not to be readily adaptable to the election of a number of presi-
dential electors. It replaced GA. CoDE ANN. § 34-2503 (1962), which called, instead, for 
appointment of the electors by the state legislature in the event of failure to attain a 
majority of the popular vote. 
The selection of electors must be made on the first Tuesday after the first Monday 
in November, the date set by Congress pursuant to art. II, § 1, par. 4 of the Constitu-
tion. It has been held that this constitutional provision also requires that the day be 
uniform throughout the nation, and that the receipt and counting of absentee ballots 
after that date would violate the requirement of uniformity. Maddox v. Board of 
State Canvassers, 116 Mont. 217, 149 P.2d 112 (1944). This would imply that any 
run-off election (as provided by Georgia law) would be invalid. But the language 
of the Constitution does not compel that interpretation. It reads: "The Congress 
may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall 
give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States." The 
last clause may be regarded as applying only to the "Day" on which the electors are 
to give their votes, and not to the "Time" of "chusing the Electors." Congress has 
apparently adopted this construction, since it has provided [3 U.S.C. § 2 (1964)]: 
"'Whenever any State has held an election for the purpose of choosing electors, and 
has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be appointed 
on a subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such State may direct." 
See also 3 U.S.C. § 4 (1964). 
Maryland, while apparently permitting an elector to be chosen by a mere 
plurality, until recently required its electors to cast their ballots for the presidential 
and vice presidential candidates receiving "the majority of the votes cast in the State 
of Maryland." MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 153, 156 (1957). The Election Code of which 
this provision was a part was repealed in 1967, and its replacement requires Maryland 
electors to vote for the candidates receiving a plurality of the popular vote in the 
state, Id. art. 33, § 20-24 (Supp. 1967). 
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which the people chose their electors by popular vote. The vote 
was divided as follows: 20 
Candidate Popular Electoral 
Jackson 152,933 99 
Adams 115,696 84 
Crawford 46,979 41 
Clay 47,136 37 
Pursuant to the Constitution, the choice devolved upon the House 
of Representatives, with each state casting one vote and a majority 
(thirteen states) necessary for election. Clay threw his support to 
Adams, who won on the first ballot. The result has generally been 
interpreted as a defeat for democratic principles, and that inter-
pretation was successfully employed by Jackson in his return match 
with Adams four years later. But because in six states the electors 
were chosen by the legislatures rather than at the polls, and because 
of the possibility that Adams may well have been the second choice 
of most of the supporters of Clay and Crawford, Adams' election 
is not a conclusive case of a defeat of the popular will. 
In 1876, by anyone's count, Democrat Samuel J. Tilden secured 
a clear popular majority over Republican Rutherford B. Hayes.21 
However, disputes arose in four states, and double sets of returns 
were sent to Congress. Apart from the disputed votes, Tilden had 
184 electoral votes and Hayes 165; twenty electoral votes were at 
stake, and Tilden needed only one of these to win.22 Congress estab-
lished an Electoral Commission to resolve the disputes, and the 
Commission, by a strict eight-to-seven party vote, found for Hayes 
in each instance. Thus, the final count was 185 for Hayes and 184 
for Tilden. In this instance, the defeat of the popular choice may 
be ascribed to the election frauds which generated the controversy 
and to the party-line votes of the Electoral Commission, rather than 
to the unresponsiveness of the electoral college to the popular vote. 
Yet, even under the Republicans' count of popular votes, Tilden 
had a majority; this demonstrates that the system itself could have 
20. S. PETERSEN, A STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
18 (1963) [hereinafter PETERSEN]. 
21. PEIRCE 87. 
22. Colorado's three electors, chosen by the legislature rather than the voters (see 
note 14 supra), voted for Hayes. PETERSEN 45, 46. If those electoral votes had not been 
counted, Tilden would have had a clear majority of the valid votes, even accepting 
the Republicans' position as to all twenty disputed electoral votes. It is striking that 
in all of the protracted debate in Congress, in the Electoral Commission, and elsewhere, 
the argument never seems to have been advanced that direct appointment by the 
legislature was invalid. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. I, 35 (1892). 
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thwarted the popular will even if there had been no controverted 
returns. 
The only apparently clear example of defeat of the popular will 
was the election of 1888, in which Grover Cleveland, who led Ben-
jamin Harrison in popular votes, was decisively defeated in the 













Although neither candidate had a majority of the popular vote, this 
would seem to be an unquestionable instance in which the plurality 
candidate lost the election. Yet we cannot be certain that, had the 
President been elected by direct popular vote, Cleveland necessarily 
would have won. If the ground rules regarding election had been 
different, the candidates would presumably have campaigned differ-
ently, aiming at total votes rather than at carrying critical states. A 
larger voter turnout would have been likely in those one-sided 
states where interest lagged because the choice of electors was fairly 
certain. For example, a more active attempt to bring out Republican 
votes in the then solid Democratic South might have been made. 
Of course, this could have been outweighed by an even larger turn-
out of othenvise complacent Democrats. In short, we will never 
know. 
A significant feature of the 1888 election was that, while Cleve-
land's 95,096 popular vote plurality availed him nothing, a switch 
of a mere 7,189 votes out of well over 1,000,000 in New York would 
have swung its thirty-six electoral votes to his column and enabled 
him to win by 204 to 197 .24 Ironically, four years earlier, Cleveland 
had beaten Blaine by 219 electoral votes to 182, also prevailing 
in the popular vote by a margin of 23,737. Yet a shift of 575 votes 
in New York would have elected Blaine (218-183), despite Cleve-
land's nationwide plurality.25 
The tremendous potential significance of a handful of votes 
in the larger states has not been overlooked; the party conventions 
usually choose candidates from the largest states, and campaigns are 
tailored to capture their electoral votes. Yet this seemingly swollen 
influence of the large-state voter appears inconsistent with the 
mathematics of the electoral college. The smaller states seem to be 
23. PETERSEN 55. 
24. PETERSEN 54. 
25. PETERSEN 51-52. 
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accorded disproportionately large representation because each state, 
regardless of population, is accorded two electoral votes correspond-
ing to its two senators as well as one for each representative; thus, 
Alaska casts one electoral vote per 75,389 inhabitants, as contrasted 
with California's one per 392,930.26 
Whose vote, then, really does count for more? Does the large-
state voter wield more influence than his counterpart in the small 
state? Is the answer dictated by the electoral vote/population ratio 
or is the instinct of the politicians more accurate? Not until this 
year has the solution been forthcoming. In a brilliant mathematical 
analysis, John E. Banzhaf, III, has demonstrated algebraically that 
the general ticket system accords each large-state voter a greater 
chance than his smaller-state counterpart to affect the ultimate re-
sult of an election despite his smaller theoretical share of the elec-
toral vote.27 In effect, the voters in a state may be compared to 
participants in a caucus, each of whom agrees to cast his vote in 
accordance with the decision of the majority; each thereby gains 
potential power, and the larger the number of participants in the 
caucus the greater the power. This factor outweighs the higher 
electoral vote/population ratio of the smaller states; a voter in Cali-
fornia or New York has been calculated to have almost three times 
the chance of affecting the final result as a voter in any of several 
smaller states.28 
Despite the difficulties encountered by the Constitutional Con-
vention in resolving the competing interests of the large and small 
states, few issues have polarized the nation along such a dividing 
line. Until about twenty years ago, proposals to change the system 
were at least ostensibly predicated more upon theoretical objections 
to unequal voting power and to the possibility of a popular winner 
becoming an electoral-college loser than upon fostering or frustrat-
ing any interests supposedly concentrated in a particular group of 
states classified by size. Over the years, the types of changes proposed 
have taken several forms. A perennial favorite has been the reversal, 
by constitutional amendment, of the practice of employing the 
general ticket. Mandatory choice of electors by separate districts 
within a state was first proposed in 1800 and has since been repeat-
edly urged; its current champion is Senator Mundt of South Dakota. 
A proposal to split each state's electoral vote in proportion to its 
popular vote was first offered in 1848; under the sponsorship of 
Senator Lodge of Massachusetts and Representative Gossett of Texas 
26. These figures are based on the 1960 Census. 
27. Banzhaf, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral 
College, 13 VILL. L. REv. 304 (1968). 
28. Id. at 329. 
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it came close to success in 1950, when it carried the Senate by more 
than the required two-thirds but died in the House. A combination 
of both proposals, whereby a state could choose either procedure 
but could not adhere to the present winner-take-all method, picked 
up no fewer than fifty-four sponsors in the Senate but nevertheless 
failed to carry, largely because of the brilliant opposition of Senator 
Paul Douglas and freshman Senator John F. Kennedy. Depending 
on the observer's political leanings, he may find poetic justice or 
irony in the fact that, under either of the two procedures, Kennedy 
probably would have lost to Nixon in 1960. 
Pursuant to either the district or the proportional plans, the 
small states would retain the mathematical advantage stemming from 
their higher electoral vote/population ratios, while the larger states 
would lose the advantage of the countervailing "caucus" factor. 
Banzhaf has calculated that under the district plan, a voter in 
Alaska would have over three times the influence of one in Cal-
ifornia or New York, and under the proportional plan, over five 
times as much.29 
But by the 1950's something new had entered the picture. The-
oretical considerations undoubtedly motivated some of the pro-
ponents of change, but there were many who openly deplored what 
they regarded as the growing influence of urban minority and labor 
groups upon the selection of Presidents and their conduct in office. 
They attributed this influence to the concentration of electoral votes 
in the populous states, where these minority and labor groups 
might hold the balance of power.30 While direct election of the 
President would have eliminated these supposed discrepancies, the 
essentially conservative leadership of the drive for the district and 
the proportional amendments soundly defeated direct popular vote 
29. Id. at 330, 331. 
30. See, e.g., remarks of Congressman Gossett of Texas, in Hearings on Amend-
ment of Constitution To Abolish Electoral College System Before Subcomm. No. 1 of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 264-65 (1951): 
Now, please understand, I have no objection to the Negro in Harlem voting 
and to his vote being counted, but I do resent the fact that both parties will spend 
a hundred times as much money to get his vote, and that his vote is worth a 
hundred times as much in the scale of national politics as is the vote of a white 
man in Texas. I have no objection to a million folks who cannot speak English 
voting, or to their votes being counted, but I do resent the fact that because they 
happen to live in Chicago, or Detroit, or New York, that their vote is worth a 
hundred times as much as mine because I happen to live in Texas. Is it fair, is it 
honest, is it democratic, is it to the best interest of anyone in fact, to place such 
a premium on a few thousam;l labor votes, or Italian votes, qr Irish votes, or Negro 
votes, or Jewish votes, or Polish votes, or Communist votes, or big-city-machine. 
votes, simply because they happen to be located in two or three large, industrial 
pivotal States? Can anything but evil come from placing .such temptation and 
such power in the hands of political parties and political qosses?· They, of course, 
will never resist the temptation of making undue appeals to these minority groups 
whose votes mean the balance of power and the election of•President. Thus, both 
said groups and said politicians are corrupted and the Natioh suffers. 
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when it was proposed. 31 Instead, this leadership strove for changes 
which would have discriminated against the large-state and large-city 
voters in the choice of the President, despite the fact that these 
voters already faced disadvantages in the composition of the Senate, 
the districting of the House of Representatives, and the apportion-
ment of the state legislatures. 
While proposed from time to time over the years, the direct 
popular vote amendment has only recently attracted much support. 
Hesitation may have sprung from the assumption that the smaller 
states would never accept the destruction of their theoretical advan-
tage; since over half of the states partook of that advantage, the 
possibility that three fourths of them would ratify such a constitu-
tional amendment seemed remote indeed.32 Other factors, however, 
would seem necessary to explain the almost two-to-one vote against 
the proposal among 254 heads of university political science depart-
ments iffa 1961 survey conducted by the Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Amendments of the Senate Judiciary Committee.33 It may be 
that the political scientists were moved by the same consideration as-
serted by John F. Kennedy in the 1956 Senate debate: "[I]t is not 
only the unit vote for the Presidency we are talking about, but a 
whole solar system of governmental power. If it is proposed to 
change the balance of power of one of the elements of the solar 
system, it is necessary to consider all the others."34 Kennedy was 
talking about the proposed district or proportional systems, but the 
same considerations would apply, albeit with somewhat less force, 
to direct popular election. 
Of course, Kennedy was speaking-and the political scientists 
were voting-before Baker v. Carr,35 Reynolds v. Sims,36 and Wes-
berry v. Sanders, 37 which invalidated the subordination of the cities 
to the rural areas in the composition of state legislatures and the 
House of Representatives. Much of the reason for retaining the 
disproportionate influence of the large states (and therefore of the 
large cities within those states)38 in the choice of the President as 
31. An amendment introduced by Senator Humphrey in 1950 was defeated 6!1-28. 
96 CoNG. REc. 1276-77 (1950). A similar amendment introduced by Senator Lehman in 
1956 was also defeated 66-17. 102 CONG. REc. 5657 (1956). 
32. See PEIRCE 185; L. WILMERDING, THE ELECI"ORAL COLLEGE 97-98 (1958); Kefauver, 
The Electoral College: Old Reforms Take on a New Look, 27 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB, 
188, 195-96 (1962). 
33. Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 691-714 (1961). 
34. 102 CONG, REC. 5150 (1956). 
35. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
36. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
37. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
38. See note 42 infra and accompanying text. 
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a countervailing inequality to balance their weakness in other 
political areas has since disappeared. In the light of these more 
recent constitutional developments, a fresh look at the problem is 
needed. 
Is there any longer a respectable case for opposing direct pop-
ular election? I, for one, believe that there is. First of all, it is too 
soon to assume that the reapportionment decisions are going to 
stick. As the readers of the March 1968 issue of this Review must 
be especially aware, a substantial effort has been mounted to reverse 
those decisions, either through an ordinary constitutional amend-
ment or through the calling of a new constitutional convention.39 
Before the populous states and cities previously prejudiced by mal-
apportionment should be asked to give up whatever advantage they 
are accorded by the present method of choosing the President, they 
might want some assurance that there will be no reversion to the 
dominance of state legislatures and the House by rural interests.40 
Apart from the danger of a recrudescence of rural domination 
of legislatures and the House, the permanent underrepresentation 
of larger states in the Senate is frozen into the Constitution even 
beyond the reach of the amending process.41 Each Alaskan's vote 
counts seventy-four times as much as each New Yorker's in the 
composition of the Senate; by comparison, the advantage accorded 
to New Yorkers by the present method of electing the President is 
slight indeed. Even without regard to legislative apportionment, 
therefore, we still must face the issue which Senator Kennedy raised 
in 1956. Too many elements in the "solar system of governmental 
power" are still loaded against the voter in the large states to war-
rant the conclusion that fairness obliges him to give up the one 
advantage which he retains. 
Perhaps more significant than countervailing inequalities are 
the practical consequences of the proposed change. It would scarcely 
be prudent to effect a permanent alteration in our political structure 
39. Symposium on the Article Ji' Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. R.Ev. 837-1016 
(1968), especially Dirksen, The Supreme Court and the People, id. at 837, and Ervin, 
Proposed Legislation To Implement the Convention Method of Amending the Consti-
tution, id. at 875. 
40. Attempts to delay the redistricting of congressional seats have also come close 
to success. See N.Y. Times, April 28, 1967, at 27, col. 4. 
41. ", •• Provided ••• that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its 
equal Suffrage in the Senate." U.S. CoNsr. art. V. It seems clear that this article, estab• 
blishing the amending process, cannot itself be amended to permit destruction of the 
guaranty of equal representation of the states in the Senate. 
Even the process of amending the Constitution is itself loaded in favor of the 
smaller states. Three groups participate in the normal amendment process: the Senate, 
the House of Representatives, and the state legislatures. Of these, only the House 
comes close to reflecting population; in the Senate and in counting the ratification 
votes of the state legislatures, the rule is not one man-one vote, but one state-one vote. 
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without careful examination of its probable effects on governmental 
processes. What influences would be strengthened, 'what weakened, 
if Presidents were to be chosen by direct vote? 
The most obvious consequence of the proposed change would be 
a reduction in the importance of the large states in the choice of the 
President. But, as mentioned above, issues in American politics have 
rarely been polarized between large and small states, so at first glance 
the change might not seem to be very significant. But large states do 
contain large cities; according to the 1960 census, of the eight 
largest cities, seven are located, one each, in the seven largest states.42 
And the cities, until recently the victims of rural-dominated ap• 
portionment of state legislatures and unequal districting in the 
House of Representatives, are in serious trouble. To whatever ex-
tent our Presidents may be influenced by the voting strength of the 
urban voters, it would seem imperative that this influence not be 
curtailed. 
Even more important, there has in recent years been an enor• 
mous influx of Negroes into the cities-to a point where over two 
thirds of all Negroes outside of the South are concentrated in our 
twelve largest cities,43 with all signs pointing to even further con-
centration in the future. The appalling conditions imposed upon 
all but a tiny fraction of them has been detailed elsewhere.44 The 
result is the most serious domestic crisis the nation has had to face 
in a century. Can we afford to reduce, even in the slightest, the like• 
lihood that the federal government will take the heroic measures 
urgently needed to cope with this crisis?45 
Changing the method of choosing the President means much 
more than turning a potential losing candidate into a winner and 
vice versa. The choice of a party candidate reflects at least in part 
the judgment of the convention delegates as to his chances for 
42. The eight largest cities, in order of population, were New York, New York; 
Chicago, Illinois; Los Angeles, California; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Detroit, Michi• 
gan; Baltimore, Maryland; Houston, Texas, and Cleveland, Ohio. The seven largest 
states were New York, California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Texas, and Michigan. 
43. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CML DISORDERS 243 (Bantam 
ed. 1968) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. According to Banzhaf's computations, all 
major cities except Baltimore and Washington, D.C., are in states in which voters have 
a greater voice than the national average in the election of the President. Banzhaf, 
supra note 27, at 329. 
44. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT. 
45. See COMMISSION REPORT 455: 
The principal burden for funding the programs we have proposed will fall upon 
the Federal Government. Caught between an inadequate and shrinking tax base 
and accelerating demands for public expenditures, the cities are not able to 
generate sufficient financing. Although there is much more that state governments 
can and should do, the taxing resources available at this level are far from 
adequate. 
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victory; under the present structure great attention must necessarily 
be paid to the popularity of the candidate with urban and Negro 
voters.46 If we reduce the influence of those voters, we will reduce 
the attention which conventions will pay to urban and Negro pref-
erences when nominating candidates. Similarly, an incumbent Pres-
ident seeking re-election-or hoping that his successor will be of the 
same party-will probably pay more attention to urban and Negro 
needs under the present system than if the balance of power were 
changed. 
The plight of the cities is becoming increasingly desperate. 
Racial tensions seem to be worsening rapidly. Compared with the 
magnitude of the problems, little enough has been done about them 
even under existing rules. Should the rules be changed in a way 
which will undoubtedly diminish just those influences which might 
prod us toward implementing the measures we so badly need?47 
Advocates of direct popular vote do not rest their case on equal-
ization of voting power alone. They point out two additional weak-
nesses in the present system which would be cured by their proposed 
amendment: the possibility of a standoff in the electoral college 
followed by a stalemate in the House of Representatives, and the 
danger that a sufficient number of electors to deprive the apparently 
victorious candidate of the presidency will vote contrary to the ex-
pectation of the voters. Do these dangers, considered together or 
separately, justify adoption of the proposed amendment? 
46. Possible illustrations include: President Franklin Roosevelt's alleged instruc-
tion, "Clear it with Sidney [Hillman]," with respect to the Democratic nomination for 
Vice President in 1944-probably resulting in the choice of Truman over Byrnes; the 
Republican nomination of Eisenhower rather than Taft in 1952 (even if based on 
misconceptions as to the farmer's political philosophy); and Kennedy's victory over 
Johnson and others in the 1960 Democratic Convention. This factor seems to have 
been less influential in the 1968 Conventions. See also note 30 supra. 
47. ,ve have no assurance, of course, that the leverage now exercised by the large 
states will continue to be applied in favor of improvement of the condition of Negroes. 
Disquieting signs of "backlash" have appeared in some of these states. At the least, 
however, political concentration upon the vote in the "swing" states should serve to 
keep attention upon the sore spots in our society. 
The time may come when leadership of the civil rights movement will pass to the 
small towns, or even to a new generation of liberals in the South. It is fair to assume, 
however, that for the time being at least the voting power of the metropolitan areas 
will weigh in the balance in favor of the amelioration of the plight of the Negroes-
and of the cities as well. 
There are additional political consequences, of possibly undesirable character, which 
may follow adoption of direct popular election of the President, but which are beyond 
the scope of this Article. For example, some feel that the two-party system, with its 
tendency to exclude doctrinaire extremism and one-issue parties from the mainstream 
of American politics, may be jeopardized if this change is made. Compare Brown, 
Proposed Amendment a Power Vacuum for Political Blackmail!, TRIAL June/July 
1967, at 15, with REPORT OF THE A.B.A. CoMMN. ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM 5-6 
(1967). 
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II. THE CONTINGENT ELECTION PROCEDURE 
Criticism has perennially been directed at the procedures ap-
plicable if no candidate secures a majority of the electoral vote. In 
such cases, the election is thrown into the House of Representatives, 
which must choose among the three leading candidates. In the 
House, each state's delegation casts one vote, and the votes of a 
majority of states (twenty-six today) are required for election. 
Only twice has this procedure been invoked48-and not since 
1824-but there have been several near misses. A third-party can-
didate whose total popular vote is large but evenly spread through-
out the nation may not secure any electoral votes and thus could 
not normally prevent one of the major party nominees from attain-
ing a majority in the electoral college.49 The danger arises from 
a regional candidate, such as George Wallace, who carried five 
Southern states; if the major party candidates run closely enough, a 
candidate like Wallace can hold the balance of power. There is 
reason to believe that this was a major purpose of the Wallace candi-
dacy and of the campaigns of his "Dixiecrat" predecessors. If a 
standoff in the electoral college were followed by a stalemate in 
the House, Wallace would have presumably tried to trade his sup-
port to one of the major party candidates in return for assurances 
of retrogression on civil rights and perhaps for promises to appoint 
conservatives (or even racists) to the Supreme Court and to other 
sensitive positions such as that of the Attorney General. 
If there is no majority in the electoral college, it is highly 
unlikely that there will be a majority of states supporting one 
candidate in the House. This conclusion does not rest solely upon 
the probability that the political complexion of each state's congres-
sional delegation will resemble the distribution of its presidential 
vote. If the delegation of a state is evenly divided it can cast no 
vote; yet a majority of all the states, voting or not, is necessary to 
elect a President. Under the current apportionment, twenty-nine of 
48. In 1800, all Democratic electors voted for both Jefferson and Burr, resulting 
in a tie. In the House of Representatives, eight states initially voted for Jefferson, 
six for Burr, and two were tied-giving no candidate the necessary majority of nine 
out of the total sixteen states. It was not until the thirty-sixth ballot that Jefferson 
prevailed. 
The other such case, in 1824, is discussed in the text accompanying note 20 supra. 
John Quincy Adams was chosen on the first ballot in the House, but only following 
considerable maneuvering on behalf of the respective candidates. 
49. Since there are usually an odd number of Representatives and an even number 
of Senators, until recently there would generally have been an odd total of electors. 
In 1961, however, the twenty-third amendment accorded the District of Columbia 
what will almost always be three electoral votes, thus resulting in an even total of 
votes and a possibility of a tie even when there are only two candidates obtaining 
electoral votes. 
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the fifty states are assigned an even number of representatives; in 
a close year, at least a few evenly split delegations are inevitable. 
Such a stalemate almost occurred in 1948. Truman led Dewey by 
over 2,000,000 popular votes, and by 303 electoral votes to 189. 
The State's Rights candidate, Strom Thurmond, garnered only 
slightly more than 1,000,000 votes but carried four states and 
secured thirty-nine electoral votes. Hence, no resort to the House 
was necessary. But if there had been a small shift in the popular 
vote in key states,50 there would have been no electoral vote major-
ity. Assuming that all representatives would have supported the 
candidates of their respective parties and that the delegations from 
the states carried by Thurmond would have supported him, the 
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· How the impasse would have been resolved is a matter, fortunately, 
only of conjecture. Edward S. Corwin has remarked that we con-
tinue to rely "on the intervention of that Providence which is said 
to have fools and the American people in its special care."52 
Again in 1960, a shift of only 9,421 votes in Illinois and Missouri, 
or several other combinations of small numbers of votes in other 
states, 53 would have thrown the election into the House of Represen-
tatives with no clear assurance as to the outcome there. Certainly, 
the present method for contingent election is unsatisfactory-indeed, 
it is dangerous. As Professor Paul J. Piccard stated: "A certain 
amount of perseverance is needed in order to discover something 
good to say about the possibility of an election of the President by 
the House of Representatives."54 But it does not follow that the 
entire electoral system must be overhauled merely to eliminate 
this one undesirable feature. If the advocates of change are moti-
vated primarily by fear of the success-this year or some year-of 
a Wallace-type candidate in stalemating the election, their purpose 
can be achieved by curing the objectionable part of the procedure. 
50. For example, a shift of only 12,487 votes in California and Ohio. PETERSEN 102. 
51, See Wechsler, Presidential Elections and the Constitution: A Comment on Pro-
posed Amendment, 35 A.B.A.J. 181 (1949). 
52, E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 67 (1957). 
53. PETERSEN 112. 
54. Piccard, The Resolution of Electoral Deadlocks by the House of Representatives, 
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Any number of remedies suggest themselves. The simplest might 
be to reduce the portion of the electoral vote needed for election 
of the candidate receiving a plurality from an absolute majority to 
something less-40 per cent or one third. American electoral prac-
tices with respect to the requirement of a majority, as distinguished 
from a mere plurality, have been ambivalent; in most instances, 
pluralities are sufficient. In almost all states, we choose our Senators, 
Representatives, and governors by plurality vote.65 And within each 
state except Georgia,56 a plurality is sufficient to elect the presidential 
electors themselves. The winners of fifteen presidential elections07 
have received less than a majority of the popular vote; indeed, this 
was true in nine of thirteen elections from 1844 to 1892, and has 
again been true in 1948, 1960, and 1968. 
Another solution would be to call an immediate run-off election 
between the two leading candidates, with all electors required to 
vote for one or the other.58 Still another alternative which would 
work in most though not all cases would be to replace the contin-
gent election by states in the House of Representatives with a joint 
session of the House and the Senate, in which each senator and 
representative would vote as an individual.59 In brief, there is no 
shortage of possible remedies for this part of the problem, and there 
is no need to throw out the entire system to cure one objectionable 
element. 
III. THE FAITHLESS ELECTOR 
The third weakness in the present system for choosing the Presi-
dent springs from the possibility that presidential electors will 
vote contrary to the assumption of the voters who selected them. If 
in SELECTING THE PRESIDENT: THE TWENTY·SEVENTH DISCUSSION AND DEBATE MANUAL 
(Aly ed. 1953-1954), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 33, at 826, 828. 
55. The Georgia Constitution has an unusual provision that if no candidate for 
governor receives a majority of the votes, the General Assembly shall choose the 
governor from between the two candidates with the largest number of votes. This 
provision was sustained by the Supreme Court in Fortson v, Morris, 385 U.S. 231 
(1966). The requirement of a majority in primary elections is common in the South 
but not elsewhere in the country. 
56. See note 19 supra. 
57. Those elections were in 1824, 1844, 1848, 1856, 1860, 1876, 1880, 1884, 1888, 
1892, 1912, 1916, 1948, 1960, and 1968. 
58. This proposal is being strenuously urged by Congressman Jonathan Bingham 
of New York. See Bingham, Keep It out of the Housel, ATLANTIC, Sept., 1968, at 85. 
59. This alternative was apparently first proposed by James Madison in 1823. 
Piccard, supra note 54, at 840. It has also been included in amendments advocated by 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson which would abolish the electoral college and 
substitute automatic computation of the electoral vote of each state in favor of the 
candidate polling a plurality of the popular vote therein. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 58, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1965); H.R.J. Res. 278, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1965). See also text 
accompanying note 125 infra. 
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such action on the part of a sufficient number of electors were to 
reverse the decision of the voters, the ensuing dispute over the 
legitimacy of the election of a new President might well inflict grave 
injuries upon the nation. If we assume that discretion on the part 
of electors to override the expectations of their constituents must 
be eliminated, there are three possible ways in which this may be 
accomplished: by the courts under existing law, by statute, or by 
constitutional amendment. 
The Founding Fathers intended the electors to be free agents,60 
but they did not foresee the growth of political parties. Hamilton's 
concept of the electors as "men most capable of analyzing the qual-
ities adapted to the station ... likely to possess the information and 
discernment requisite to such complicated investigations"61 did not 
accurately reflect the situation for long. In 1788 and 1792 ·washing-
ton was everyone's choice anyway. By 1796, political parties were 
evolving, and electors were being pledged to support their respective 
parties' candidates. In that year, Samuel Miles, a Federalist elector 
from Pennsylvania, voted for Jefferson instead of Adams, evoking this 
comment from a Federalist voter: "Do I chuse Samuel Miles to deter-
mine for me whether John Adams or Thomas Jefferson shall be 
President? Nol I chuse him to act, not to think."62 By 1800, party 
discipline had already evolved to a point where it caused the Demo-
crats acute embarrassment. In that year, each of their electors duti-
fully voted for both Jefferson and Burr, causing a tie that could be 
resolved only with the assistance of some of the Federalist members 
of the House of Representatives.63 "With the removal of this problem 
by the twelfth amendment, the compulsion for the strict adherence 
to party mandate grew even stronger. 
In 1820, elector Samuel Plumer-contrary to the expectations qf 
his constituents-voted for John Quincy Adams instead of James 
Monroe, thereby preventing Monroe from sharing Washington's dis-
tinction of being the unanimous choice of the electoral college. But 
apart from some unclear cases arising from the four-way election of 
1824,64 there has not until recently been a single subsequent instance 
of an elector following his own bent.6:; Indeed, in 1876, when James 
60. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 232-33 (1952) Oustice Jackson dissenting); THE 
FEDERALisr No. 68 (Hamilton). 
61. THE F.EDERALisr No. 68, at 508-09 0- Hamilton ed. 1868). 
62. E. STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY 51 (1928). 
63. See notes 15 and 48 supra. 
64. See PEIRCE 123. 
65. As Thomas Hart Benton wrote, in S. REP. No. 22, 19th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1826): 
In the first election held under the constitution, the people looked beyond these 
agents [electors], fixed upon their own candidates for President and Vice President, 
and took pledges from the electoral candidates to obey their will. In every subse-
quent election, the same thing has been done. Electors, therefore, have not 
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Russell Lowell, a Republican elector from Massachusetts, might have 
cast his vote for Tilden and thereby spared the nation the crisis that 
followed,66 he felt obliged not to do so. He wrote to Leslie Stephen: 
In my own judgment I have no choice, and am bound in honor 
to vote for Hayes, as the people who chose me expected me to do. 
They did not choose me because they had confidence in my judg-
ment, but because they thought they knew what that judgment would 
be. If I had told them that I should vote for Tilden, they would 
never have nominated me. It is a plain question of trust. The pro-
voking part of it is that I tried to escape nomination all I could, and 
only did not decline because I thought it would be making too much 
fuss over a trifle. 61 
As Justice Jackson stated in 1952: 
Electors, although often personally eminent, independent, and re-
spectable, officially became voluntary party lackeys and intellectual 
nonentities to whose memory we might justly paraphrase a tuneful 
satire: 
"They always voted at their Party's call 
And never thought of thinking for themselves at all." 
As an institution the Electoral College suffered atrophy almost in-
distinguishable from rigor mortis. os 
Three electors have voted contrary to mandate in recent years. In 
1948, Preston Parks appeared on two slates in Tennessee, one com-
mitted to Truman and one to Thurmond. Although the Truman 
ticket carried the state, Parks cast his vote for Thurmond. In 1956, 
W. F. Turner, a Democratic elector in Alabama, cast his vote for 
Walter E. Jones, a local judge, instead of supporting Adlai Stevenson, 
the party nominee. In these cases, as with Samuel Plumer in 1820, 
the votes involved had no consequence, and the purpose of the elec-
tors was apparently to make a gesture rather than to affect the choice 
of the President. But in 1960 a much more disquieting incident 
occurred. 
Shortly after election day, one Lea Harris of Montgomery, Ala-
bama, circularized the newly chosen electors, urging them to withhold 
electoral votes from Kennedy (and Nixon as well) and to agree upon 
a ticket acceptable to conservative sentiment, particularly in the 
South. As one of several such tickets, Harris suggested Byrd for 
answered the design of their institution. They are not the independent body and 
superior characters which they were intended to be. They are not left to the 
exercise of their own judgment; on the contrary, they give their vote, or bind 
themselves to give it, according to the will of their constituents. they have de-
generated into mere agents, in a case which requires no agency, and where the 
agent must be useless, if he is faithful, and dangerous, if he is not. 
66. See text accompanying note 21 supra. 
67. 2 H. SCUDDER, JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL 216-17 (1901). 
68. Dissenting, in Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 232 (1952). 
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President and Goldwater for Vice President. One Republican elector, 
Henry D. Irw'in of Oklahoma, sent out further solicitations of his 
own. In the end, however, he alone switched, and since his vote 
represented a shift from Nixon to Byrd it did not diminish Kennedy's 
majority. Called to testify before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee 
considering constitutional amendments relating to the election of the 
President, Irwin claimed to have had the "tacit support" of the 
Republican National Committee, but on cross-examination it was 
established that he had garnered little more than vague expressions 
of sympathy from a few national committeemen and had been re-
buffed in many quarters.69 But it is disquieting to speculate on what 
a better-organized campaign to subvert electors might have achieved, 
or what Messrs. Harris and Irwin themselves might have accom-
plished if Kennedy had had only, say, two or three instead of thirty-
four electoral votes over the 269 necessary for a majority. 
Still, four runaway electors in 144 years is not very many, espe-
cially when balanced against the 15,245 electoral votes70 cast in all 
the elections between 1820 and 1964. Adherence to party candidates 
is still, ovenvhelmingly, the norm. The insignificance of the electors 
is reflected in the election laws of thirty-five states, which do not even 
list them on the ballots or voting machines. Instead, these states recite 
the names of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, in 
some cases prefaced by the phrase "Electors for."71 Clearly, the people 
believe they are voting for the President, and on the Wednesday after 
the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November the newspapers 
unhesitatingly report the election results with complete confidence 
that the electoral vote will be cast in accordance with the preferences 
of the voters. 
Despite this solidly established practice of fidelity on the part of 
electors, suppose a plan such as that of Messrs. Harris and Invin 
were to succeed, and a sufficient number of electors voted contrary 
to pledge or expectation to defeat the candidate who would have 
won and confer victory upon his opponent. Can the Constitution be 
regarded as having been changed by almost two centuries of nearly 
consistent practice, so that the preference of the voters can take pre-
cedence over the decision of the electors? And even if the disobedient 
vote of an elector is regarded as legally improper, is there an effective 
judicial remedy for its correction? 
The first question is whether such an unfaithful vote would be 
illegal at all. Certainly, electors' discretion conforms to the original 
69. See Hearings, supra note 33, at 562-656. 
70. PEIRCE 124. 
71. PEIRCE 338. 
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concept of the Framers72 and has never been changed by explicit 
constitutional amendment. Can the practice of the ensuing years be 
deemed nevertheless to have amended the Constitution to the point 
where an elector who attempted to vote contrary to the voters' man-
date would be deemed to have violated a legal, as distinguished from 
a moral, obligation? The Constitution is an evolving instrument, but 
can it evolve to a point diametrically opposite its original import? 
A lower New York court once answered this question affirma-
tively. In Thomas v. Cohen,73 a voter challenged the constitutionality 
of the practice of putting only the names of the presidential and 
vice-presidential candidates on the voting machines, arguing that 
since he was voting for electors who would be free to exercise discre-
tion he had a right to know for whom he was voting. While conceding 
that the Framers intended electors to use their own judgment, the 
court concluded that intervening history had imposed a legal obliga-
tion on the electors to vote for their parties' nominees: 
The electors are expected to choose the nominee of the party they 
represent, and no one else. So sacred and compelling is that obliga-
tion upon them, so long has its observance been recognized by faith-
ful performance, so unexpected and destructive of order in our land 
would be its violation, that the trust that was originally conferred 
upon the electors by the people, to express their will by the selections 
they make, has, over these many years, ripened into a bounden duty 
-as binding upon them as if it were written into the organic law. 
The elector who attempted to disregard that duty could, in my opin-
ion, be required by mandamus to carry out the mandate of the 
voters of his State.74 
The court relied75 on a quotation from Chief Justice Hughes' opinion 
in Smiley v. Holm: "General acquiescence cannot justify departure 
from the law, but long and continuous interpretation in the course 
of official action under the law may aid in removing doubts as to its 
meaning."76 Since the New York court conceded, however, that the 
original intention was clear, the use of practical construction to alter 
it would seem to go well beyond Hughes' reference. It should be 
noted in passing that the practice of omitting the electors' names 
from the ballot might have been sustained without deciding that the 
electors no longer have discretion. The practice was upheld in Ohio, 
72. The requirement in both art. II, § 1 and the twelfth amendment that the 
electors "vote by ballot" may be regarded as implying a written, secret vote, adding 
further support for the notion of untrammeled discretion. But, "by common practice 
since the earliest days, the ballot is not secret and sometimes is not even a ballot at all." 
PEIRCE 129-30. 
73. 146 N.Y. Misc. 836, 262 N.Y. Supp. 320 (Sup. Ct. 1933). 
74. 146 N.Y. Misc. at 841-42, 262 N.Y. Supp. at 326. 
75. 146 N.Y. at 846, 262 N.Y. Supp. at 330-31. 
76. 285 U.S. 355, 369 (1932). 
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for example, on the basis of the broad authority conferred upon the 
states by the Constitution to direct the manner in which electors are 
to be chosen.77 
Thomas v. Cohen stands almost alone.78 The issue has seldom 
arisen squarely, but dicta in a number of state court decisions indi-
cate that the discretion of the electors still endures.79 The Supreme 
Court has never passed on the issue, but it arose tangentially in Ray 
v. Blair80 in 1952. 
Alabama had authorized political parties to choose their respec-
tive presidential electors in a state-controlled party primary election 
and to fix the qualifications for the candidates. The State Executive 
Committee of the Democratic Party required all candidates for 
presidential elector to take a pledge to support the nominees of their 
party's national convention. One Edmund Blair refused to take such 
a pledge, and the Executive Committee refused to certify him as a 
candidate. He obtained from the Alabama courts a mandamus di-
recting the chairman of the Executive Committee to certify him as 
a candidate for elector in the forthcoming primary, and the state 
supreme court upheld the mandamus on the ground that the pledge 
requirement was an unconstitutional restriction on an elector's dis-
cretion to vote as he chose in the electoral college.81 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed in a five-to-two 
decision, declaring: 
77. State ex rel. Hawke v. Myers, 132 Ohio St. 18, 4 N.E.2d 397 (1936). 
78. State ex rel. Nebraska Republican State Cent. Comm. v. Wait, 92 Neb. 313, 
325, 138 N.W. 159, 163 (1912), may also be regarded as premised upon the notion of a 
legal duty on the part of electors to support their party's nominees. Theodore 
Roosevelt won the 1912 Nebraska Republican preference primary, but Taft received 
the national Republican nomination. Six Roosevelt supporters who had been nomi-
nated by the Republican Party as Nebraska electors were also chosen as the nominees 
of the state Progressive Party. The petitioner was awarded a peremptory writ of 
mandamus to compel the secretary of state to print the names of other persons as 
Republican candidates for electors instead of the six Roosevelt men. The Nebraska 
supreme court affirmed on the ground that the six had forfeited their position as 
Republican candidates by accepting the Progressive nomination. The court stated: 
Here the persons who have been nominated as presidential electors, having, if 
elected, but a single duty to perform, viz., to vote for the candidates nominated 
by the party by whose votes they were themselves nominated, openly declare that 
they will not perform that duty, but will vote for the candidates of another and 
distinctly antagonistic party. This would make performance of their duty im-
possible, and a judicial determination of the existence of a vacancy was, therefore, 
unnecessary. The candidates had by their own acts, vacated their places as Re• 
publican presidential electors. 
See also Johnson v. Coyne, 47 S.D. 138, 142, 196 N.W. 492, 493 (1923), holding that 
despite a state law permitting only one office for each nominating petition, a single 
petition for an entire slate of electors was valid, because "presumably this group 
stands as a unit for one candidate for President." 
79. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, No. 87, 250 Ala. 399, 400, 34 S.2d 598, 600 
(1948); Breidenthal v. Edwards, 57 Kan. 332, 337, 46 P. 469, 470 (1896); State ex rel. 
Beck v. Hummel, 150 Ohio St. 127, 146, 80 N.E.2d 899, 908 (1948). 
80. 343 U.S. 214. 
81. 257 Ala. 151, 57 S.2d 395 (1952). 
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A state's or a political party's exclusion of candidates from a party 
primary because they will not pledge to support the party's nomi-
nees is a method of securing party candidates in the general election, 
pledged to the philosophy and leadership of that party. It is an 
exercise of the state's right to appoint electors in such manner, 
subject to possible constitutional limitations, as it may choose. U. S. 
Const., Art. II, § l,82 
The Court went on to point out that pledges to support party 
nominees were common from the earliest days of the Republic: 
This long-continued practical interpretation of the constitutional 
propriety of an implied or oral pledge of his ballot by a candidate 
for elector as to his vote in the electoral college weighs heavily in 
considering the constitutionality of a pledge, such as the one here 
required, in the primary. 
However, even if such promises of candidates for the electoral 
college are legally unenforceable because violative of an assumed 
constitutional freedom of the elector under the Constitution, Art. II, 
§ I, to vote as he may choose in the electoral college, it would not 
follow that the requirement of a pledge in the primary is uncon-
stitutional. sa 
Justice Jackson's dissent, joined by Justice Douglas, pointed out 
the atrophied independence of the elector, 84 but nevertheless de-
clared that "the balloting [ of the electors in the electoral college] 
cannot be constitutionally subject to any such control because it was 
intended to be free, an act performed after all functions of the elec-
toral process left to the states have been completed."85 He added: 
It may be admitted that this law does no more than to make a 
legal obligation of what has been a voluntary general practice. If 
custom were sufficient authority for amendment of the Constitution 
by Court decree, the decision in this matter would be warranted. 
Usage may sometimes impart changed content to constitutional gen-
eralities, such as "due process of law," "equal protection," or "com-
merce among the states." But I do not think powers or discretions 
granted to federal officials by the Federal Constitution can be for-
feited by the Court for disuse. A political practice which has its origin 
in custom must rely upon custom for its sanctions.86 
Two Justices thus indicated squarely that they regarded the elector's 
freedom of choice to be untrammeled. The majority did not directly 
reach the issue. 
Thus, the question of whether a state may bind the vote of an 
elector is still open. At least thirteen states87 and the District of 
82. 343 U.S. at 227. 
83. 343 U.S. at 229-30. 
84. See text accompanying notes 60-71 supra. 
85. 343 U.S. at 233. 
86. 343 U.S. at 233. 
87. ALAsKA STAT. § 15.30.090 (1962); CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 25105 (West 1961); 
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Columbia88 now have legislation which may be regarded as doing so, 
and it can be argued that all thirty-five states which omit the names 
of the electors from the ballot implicitly do the same thing.89 While 
the Supreme Court has not been noticeably reluctant in recent years 
to invalidate the laws of large numbers of states when issues of civil 
rights or civil liberties have been involved, there is nevertheless a 
heavy presumption in favor of the constitutionality of legislation the 
enactment of which has been widespread. It may follow that there is 
a stronger case for upholding a restriction on the freedom of electors 
where it has been decreed by state legislation than where it has not. 
Thomas v. Cohen is all the more remarkable for having been decided 
as it was in the absence of express statutory provisions purporting to 
bind the electors. 
Apart from the long-standing practice of elector fealty and the 
state legislation on the subject, there are two additional points which 
might add strength to the case for binding electors. First, Congress 
itself has in one area attempted to bind electors. The twenty-third 
amendment was adopted in 1961, providing for representation of the 
District of Columbia in the electoral college, and declaring: 
The District ... shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may 
direct [a designated number of electors who] shall be considered, 
for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to 
be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District 
and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of 
amendment.90 
Congress promptly enacted implementing legislation prescribing the 
procedures for participation by the District of Columbia in presiden-
tial elections, stating in pertinent part: "Each person elected as elec-
CoLo. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 49-20-1(5) (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. R.Ev. § 9-176 (1967); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 103.021 (Supp. 1968); HAWAII REV. LAws § 11-221 (Supp. 1965); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 34-904 (Supp. 1967); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 20-4 (Supp. 1967); NEV. R.Ev. 
STAT. §§ 298.050 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-10-1.1 (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
26, § 519-21 (Supp. 1967); ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 248.355 (Replacement Part 1965); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 2-403 (1956). See also VA. CooE ANN. § 24-290.6 (1950), declaring how 
electors are "expected" to vote. None of these laws appears to have come before 
the courts. 
88. D.C. CODE ANN. § l-1108(g) (1967). 
89. While some of these state laws prescribe criminal punishment for violation of 
an elector's pledge, none e.xpressly purports to reverse his vote in such a case. 
A law which would fully test legislative power over elector discretion would be 
one which automatically forfeited his office upon casting a defecting vote. Other 
electors or party officials could be authorized to fill the vacancy on the spot. His 
initial appointment would have been conditional upon his performing his promise. 
This would require open voting and would certainly encounter a contention that 
the balloting must be secret. 
Kirby, Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Elections, 27 
l.AW 8e CONTEMP. PROB. 495, 509 (1962). 
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. 
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tor of President and Vice President shall, in the presence of the 
Board, take an oath or solemnly affirm that he will vote for the 
candidates of the party he has been nominated to represent, and it 
shall be his duty to vote in such manner in the electoral college."91 
This would seem to reflect a determination by Congress either that 
all electors are bound to vote for their party's candidates, or that 
since the states are empowered to bind electors so to vote, Congress, 
acting like a state legislature with respect to the District of Colum-
bia, can do the same. We therefore have what might be regarded as 
a contemporaneous construction of a constitutional amendment by 
Congress, which, although not necessarily decisive,92 should be ac-
corded great weight.93 But the construction is contemporaneous 
only with respect to the twenty-third amendment, while its prin-
cipal significance lies in connection with the much more ancient 
article II, section I, and the twelfth amendment. 
Second, the twenty-fourth amendment, ratified in 1964, abolish-
ing the poll tax in connection with presidential and congressional 
elections, speaks of the right to vote "in any primary or other election 
for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice 
President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress .... "94 The 
legislative history does not explain why it was deemed necessary to 
include the italicized phrase, but a possible inference is that Congress 
and the ratifying states regarded the voters, at least in those states 
not listing the electors on the ballot, as voting directly for the Presi-
dent and Vice President. 95 If so, the argument that the electors are 
bound would seem to be strengthened. 
None of the foregoing adds up to a clear case for the proposition 
that the elector is bound to vote for his party's choices, or even that 
the state legislatures may so bind him. But there seems to be at least 
a respectable argument for either of these propositions.96 Let us 
91. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-ll0B(g) (1967) (emphasis added) (derived from Act of Oct. 
4, 1961, 75 Stat. 818). 
92. Cf., e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
93. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819); Stuart v. 
Laird, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 299, 309 (1803). 
94. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XXIV. 
95. Another possible purpose might have been to cover presidential preference 
primaries, where held. Cf. Hearings on S. ]. Res. 4 Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess., I 45 (1968). 
96. See Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1, 12 (1934): 
[W]herever there are today established practices "under" or "in accordance with" 
the Document, it is only the practice which can legitimatize the words as being 
still part of our going Constitution. It is not the words which legitimatize the 
practice. This is the first principle of a sane theory of our constitutional law. Its 
necessity is patent wherever practice has flatly abrogated a portion of this "su-
preme law of the land." Discretion in the electoral college is the classic jnstance; 
can any doubt that if that college should today disregard therr mandate, such action 
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assume that our constitutional system has indeed evolved to a point 
where the elector is no longer free. How would his obligation to 
honor the voters' mandate be enforced in a concrete case? 
Thus far, in those few instances in which an elector disregarded 
his party mandate, the results of the election were unaffected; there 
was no interest in instituting litigation to compel or reverse his 
vote.D7 Suppose, however, that in a close election a sufficient number 
of electors were persuaded, or even bribed, to vote in such fashion 
as to deprive the apparent winner of a majority in the electoral col-
lege-either throwing the election into the House of Representa-
tives or handing victory to the apparent loser. Would, and could, 
the courts act to prevent such a "theft" of the presidency? 
First of all, let us assume a case in which the intention of the 
runaway electors was manifested in advance. Presumably actions 
would be instituted, in either the state or federal courts, to test the 
propriety of their expected conduct. 
As for state court actions, a case might be based either on the 
theory that the Constitution now forbids elector discretion or on a 
state statute purporting to restrict it; in the latter case, the constitu-
tionality of the state statute would of course be an issue. In any event, 
it would not be safe to generalize as to whether state courts would 
find that a candidate, state official, voter, or taxpayer has sufficient 
standing to raise the issue. Moreover, it is not clear whether relief 
in mandamus or by way of injunction could be granted. While 
mandamus would seem appropriate enough to test the contention 
that the duties of electors are purely ministerial, there may be doubt 
as to the propriety of mandamus where the time for the official to act 
has not yet arrived. 98 And there may still be some vitality in the dis-
credited doctrine that injunctions are not granted to protect mere 
political rights.DD Mere declaratory relief, without sanction, might not 
be a sufficient deterrent. If what is really sought is a quick dispositive 
ruling by the United States Supreme Court, there would be no way 
would be contrary to our Constitution? Yet "vote by ballot"-the original language, 
repeated in the Twelfth Amendment-is a strange way of saying "act as rubber 
stamps." [Emphasis in the original]. 
For an interesting and persuasive argument that state power to bind electors would 
implement, rather than defeat, the purposes of the Framers, see Note, State Power To 
Bind Presidential Electors, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 696 (1965); cf. Kirby, Limitations on the 
Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Elections, 27 I.Aw & CONTEMP. PROB, 
495, 505-06 (1962). 
97. In each such instance, Congress counted the electoral votes as actually cast. 
98. While one frequently encounters the statement that even where the duty of a 
public official is merely ministerial, mandamus will not lie if the violation of duty 
has not yet occurred but has merely been threatened for the future [see, e.g., 55 C.J.S. 
MANDAMUS § 33 (1948)], it is doubtful whether most courts would refuse to grant 
mandamus on that ground. See, e.g., People ex rel. Hotchkiss v. Smith, 206 N.Y. 231, 
241, 99 N.E. 568, 571 (1912). 
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to ensure that the delay involved in appeals through the state judicial 
system would not exhaust, many times over, the precious few days 
remaining before the electors were to cast their ballots.100 
Federal court actions would seem to offer more hope. Baker v. 
Carr101 probably assures standing to voters alleging that their votes 
are about to be nullified.102 Since electors have been characterized as 
state rather than federal officials, 103 even though they perform a fed-
eral function, the mandamus jurisdiction conferred by section 1311 
of the Judicial Code104 would probably be inapplicable. Injunctive 
relief, however, would appear to be available under section 1343(3) 
of the Judicial Code, which reads: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person ... 
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privi-
lege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States 
or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or 
of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.105 
If, as we are assuming arguendo, a voter has a constitutional right to 
cast an effective vote for President, an elector who casts his ballot 
contrary to the voters' mandate may be said to be acting under color 
of state law to deprive the voters of that constitutional right. While 
section 1343 was intended primarily to implement the Reconstruc-
tion amendments,106 and while the limitations on state action under 
the Reconstruction amendments dwarf those under all other pro-
visions of the Constitution, the provision has nevertheless been used 
occasionally to redress deprivations of other constitutional rights.107 
99. See Note, Injunctive Protection of Political Rights in the Federal Courts, 62 
HARV. L. REv. 659, 666-67 (1949); cf. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486, 488 (1903). 
100. Supreme Court review of state court decisions may apply only to "[f]inal 
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could 
be had .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964). 
101. 369 U.S. 186, 204-08 (1962). 
102. A candidate himself would apparently also have standing to raise the question. 
103. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224-25 (1952). 
104. 28 u.s.c. § 1311 (1964). 
105. 28 u.s.c. § 1343(3) (1964). 
106. See Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1900). 
107. See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 531 (1939) (opinion of Justice Stone) (The 
test is whether the "gist of the cause of action was not damage or injury to property, 
but unconstitutional infringement of a right of personal liberty not susceptible of 
valuation in money.'); Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 105 Fed. 
536 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900) (full faith and credit clause). 
28 U.S.C. § 133I(a) (1964) might also confer jurisdiction upon federal district 
courts, since the action seemingly "arises under the Constitution ••• of the United 
States," but the $10,000 jurisdictional amount would probably defeat any plaintiff 
other than the presidential or vice-presidential candidates themselves. 
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The losing party in an action under section 1343 could seek 
speedy Supreme Court review by immediately docketing an appeal 
in the court of appeals and asking the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari before decision by the court of appeals pursuant to section 
1254(1) of the Judicial Code.108 I£ the Supreme Court were willing, 
it could also render a quick decision in advance of the preparation 
of full opinions.100 
It is far from clear, however, whether the Supreme Court would 
either consider the case or permit lower federal or state courts to 
do so. There is a serious chance that the action would be barred as 
raising a "political question." Although Baker v. Carr held the politi-
cal question doctrine inapplicable in one type of voting rights case 
(state legislative apportionment), the Court stated that "it is the 
relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of 
the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship 
to the States, which gives rise to the 'political question.' "110 While 
issues of federal-state relationships are obviously present in an action 
challenging the vote of an unfaithful elector, the main problem 
involves the intrusion of the courts into a decision-making process 
which arguably has been committed finally to Congress. The twelfth 
amendment requires the electors in each state to sign and certify 
lists of their votes for President and Vice President 
and transmit [them] sealed to the seat of government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate;-The President of the 
Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representa-
tives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;-
The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall 
be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number 
of Electors appointed .... 111 
This is not definitely a final commitment to Congress of the power 
to resolve disputed votes, but it has some of the hallmarks of one. In 
using the passive voice-"the votes shall then be counted" -the 
Framers broke one of the cardinal rules of draftsmanship;112 yet it 
108. 28 u.s.c. § 1254(1) (1964). 
109. For examples of announcement of the decision prior to publication of the 
opinion in cases involving presidential elections, see McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 
22 n.l (1892); Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 154, full opinion delivered, 343 U.S. 214 (1952). 
While an attempt might be made, instead, to invoke the original jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, it seems unlikely that a state would be a proper plaintiff, and even 
more improbable that either the United States or another state would be the ap-
propriate defendant. 
110. 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). 
111. U.S. CONsr. amend. XII. 
112. "The famous phrase of the Constitution 'the votes shall then be counted' has 
been like an apple of discord almost since the beginning of the Government." J. 
DOUGHERTY, THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF nm UNITED STATES 254 (1906). The respective 
roles of the Vice President and of the two houses of Congress were the subject of 
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seems clear that the counting shall be done by the President of the 
Senate (usually the Vice President of the United States) or by some 
individual, committee, or the whole of the legislative branch. On the 
other hand, it can be argued that "[t]he person having the greatest 
number of votes" connotes an objective standard, and is not the same 
as saying "the person having the greatest number of votes, as so 
counted." 
In any event, Congress has taken this function unto itself. 
While disagreements in the past concerned the credentials of oppos-
ing slates of electors rather than the validity of votes cast by electors 
whose title to the office was undisputed, nevertheless Congress itself 
established the procedures whereby the Hayes-Tilden imbroglio was 
decided113 and has since enacted permanent legislation purporting 
to regulate future disputes.114 
In McPherson v. Blacker,115 an 1892 decision in which the United 
States Supreme Court upheld Michigan's statute providing for the 
district system for selection of electors, counsel for the state con-
tended that the "political question" doctrine barred court action. 
The Court rejected this contention for the reason that "the validity 
of the state law was drawn in question as repugnant to [the United 
States] constitution and laws, and its validity was sustained."116 A 
mere recital of the statutory basis for what was then the jurisdiction 
of the Court on writ of error does not meet the "political question" 
contention; the doctrine is normally invoked in cases in which the 
statutory basis for jurisdiction is undisputed. If the vote of an 
unfaithful elector were challenged today, the statutory basis would 
be present in a federal district court, or in the Supreme Court on 
review from either a lower federal court or the highest state court. 
There would remain, however, the question whether the case was 
appropriate for judicial action. The principal distinction between 
such a case and McPherson is that the way in which the electors are 
frequent congressional debates over the years, and passions frequently rose high over 
what was only of theoretical importance in every election save that of 1876. See id., 
chs. 2, 4; Wroth, Election Contests and the Electoral Vote, 65 DxcK. L. REv. 321 (1961). 
113. Act of Jan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, 19 Stat. 227. 
114. 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 15-18 (1964). 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) permits the rejection of electoral 
votes even of electors whose appointments have been lawfully certified by proper state 
authority if both houses of Congress "agree that such vote or votes have not been so 
regularly given by electors whose appointment has been so certified." Cf. J. DOUGHERTY, 
supra note 112, at 235. No definition of "regularly given" is provided, and while Con-
gress has thus far always recorded the electoral votes as actually cast, it might at some 
time treat this clause as authorizing it to reject votes cast contrary to pledge or ex-
pectation. At most, this would seem only to cancel such votes and not to record them 
in favor of the party candidates. 
115. 146 U.S. I. 
116. 146 U.S. at 23. 
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chosen is committed by the Constitution to the states, while the way 
in which the votes of the electors are counted may arguably be 
regarded as having been committed to Congress.117 
In Coleman v. Miller/18 the Court held nonjusticiable under the 
political question doctrine the issue of whether a state legislature's 
attempted ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment was 
invalid either because of prior rejection by the same state or because 
of an excessive lapse of time. The Court based its decision on "the 
ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over 
the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment."119 But the 
commitment to Congress is even less clear in the case of constitutional 
amendments than it is in the case of presidential elections. Lapse of 
time is usually provided for in the joint resolution proposing an 
amendment, so perhaps the lack of such a clause in the child labor 
amendment involved in the Coleman case may be regarded as raising 
an issue for congressional determination. But there is not a whisper 
in the language of the Constitution as to any function committed to 
Congress in connection with the ratification of amendments it has 
proposed to the states, and it may be assumed that an amendment 
takes effect when a sufficient number of ratifications are reported 
even if Congress is not in session at the time. On this basis, the argu-
ment for nonjusticiability would be even stronger in the presidential 
election case than it was in Coleman. 
On the other hand, the Court in Coleman stated: "In determining 
whether a question falls within [the political question] category, the 
appropriateness under our system of government of attributing final-
ity to the action of the political departments and also the lack of 
satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant con-
siderations. "120 Viewed in the light of this pronouncement, the issue 
is less clear. A decision by the courts rendered before transmission of 
the electoral votes to Congress would not upset the finality of some-
thing Congress had already done; yet the possibility of conflict would 
remain, since Congress might make its mvn determination at variance 
with the decision of the Court. In any event, there would quite 
clearly be "satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination" in the 
case of an unfaithful elector; whether an elector is or is not obliged 
117. In a recent case challenging the method used by the states in choosing electors 
-specifically the general ticket system-the Supreme Court refused to entertain a 
complaint brought before it pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Delaware v. New 
York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966). No reason for the refusal was stated. See also Williams v. 
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 37 U.S.L.W. 2065 (E.D. Va. July 16, 1968); Penton v. 
Humphrey, 264 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Miss. 1967). 
118. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
119. 307 U.S. at 450. 
120. 307 U.S. at 454-55 (footnote omitted). 
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to vote for the candidates of his party, and whether or not a specific 
elector has in fact done so, are readily manageable judicial questions. 
Returning to Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court's last word on the 
problem, some guidance may have been intended by Justice Bren-
nan's summary: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political 
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or 
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination 
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a 
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack 
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.121 
The implication seems to be that if any one of these elements is 
present, the courts should abstain. Some of them are at least arguably 
involved in the counting of electoral votes. Whether that process 
may be regarded as having been :finally committed to Congress has 
been discussed above.122 Lack of respect for Congress might be harder 
to find if the Court acted before Congress did. In any event, a judicial 
decision would seemingly have to be rendered before Congress 
counted the votes, or not at all; once a President was proclaimed by 
Congress to have been elected, anything short of "unquestioning 
adherence" to its decision would probably provoke a far more serious 
crisis than that which the courts were seeking to avert. 
This is not an attempt to analyze in depth the problem of whether 
the issue of electors' independence is to be regarded as justiciable, 
but merely an effort to show that the question is a close one, with no 
assurance that a judicial determination could be obtained. Moreover, 
even if such a determination were obtained, the possibility that an 
elector would defy an injunction and vote contrary to his mandate 
should not be overlooked; with the stakes so high, fear of contempt 
proceedings might not prove to be a sufficient deterrent. A further 
stretching of legal theory would be required in order to negate or 
reverse a vote so cast. 
As uncertain as the prospects appear for securing effective aid 
from the courts to prevent electors from voting contrary to the 
voters' expectations if the electors are cooperative enough to reveal 
121. 369 U.S. at 127. See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 591·96 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968) (opinion of Burger, J.). 
122. See text accompanying notes 111-14 supra. 
November 1968] Presidential Elections 31 
their intentions in advance, the problems would be magnified if 
knowledge of their defection were to trickle out only after they had 
cast their votes. It would then be too late to enjoin them from voting 
in such fashion, and perhaps too late to enjoin the certifying officials 
of their states from reporting their votes as cast. Even if an aberrant 
vote could be nullified on some theory (thus dividing its effect in 
half), could it be treated affirmatively as cast in accordance with the 
expectations of the voters? Once the "list" of electoral votes has been 
transmitted to Congress, against whom would a lawsuit be brought? 
The purpose would have to be to control the counting of the elec-
toral votes. But courts would obviously be most reluctant to issue 
an injunction or mandamus against the President of the Senate123 or 
the Congress as a whole.124 
Thus, in addition to the chance that our present electoral system 
would give the presidency to the less popular candidate and the 
danger of a stalemate in the House of Representatives, there is the 
possible nightmare of a dispute over a "stolen" presidency. But while 
this eventuality would be prevented by the proposed constitutional 
amendment providing for direct popular election, there are other 
ways of accomplishing the same result with perhaps fewer side effects. 
Both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations have advocated 
the adoption of an amendment preserving the present method of 
assigning electoral votes to the several states, but recording the elec-
toral votes automatically upon the basis of the popular votes cast in 
each state, eliminating the electors as such.125 As part of this plan, the 
general ticket system-now universally employed by custom-would 
become mandatory.126 Originally gaining substantial support, includ-
ing sponsorship by Senator Bayh and endorsement by the Bar Associ-
ation of the City of New York, the proposal has more recently been 
eclipsed by the strong drive in favor of direct popular election. 
Nevertheless, it has the distinct virtue of completely eliminating the 
problem of the straying elector without causing the shift in the 
political balance of power discussed above.127 
Could Congress solve the problem without the necessity of a con-
123. One can imagine, in the 1968 election, a case entitled Humphrey v. Humphrey; 
or Nixon v. Nixon in 1960. 
124. "The Congress is the legislative department of the government; the President 
is the executive department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial 
department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to 
its cognizance." Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 500 (1866). 
125. See Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amend-
ments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 363,91 (1961); Hear-
ings, supra note 95, at 151-71; H.R. Doc. No. 364, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1966). 
126. See Hearings, supra note 125. 
127. See text accompanying note 29 supra. 
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stitutional amendment? Would an act of Congress providing that all 
electoral votes are to be counted as votes for the candidates of the 
electors' respective parties be valid? Could such a statute at least 
provide for this result in those states in which the names of the presi-
dential and vice-presidential candidates appear on the ballots? (Or 
where, in addition, the electors' names do not appear?) At the outset, 
we are faced with the difficulty that the Constitution appears to 
entrust the process of choosing electors to the discretion of the respec-
tive state legislatures. Congress is authorized only to "determine the 
Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give 
their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United 
States."128 Otherwise, the process of selecting electors is committed to 
the states, and, as pointed out above, need not even be by election.120 
A possible foothold may be found in the fact that the states are 
obliged to transmit their lists to the President of the Senate, who 
"shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted.''130 It 
is at least arguable that some power to decide how the votes are to be 
counted is thereby conferred, ir not upon Congress per se in its legis-
lative capacity, nevertheless upon the two houses of Congress in a 
special vote-counting capacity. 
Is this a sufficient basis for Congress to legislate? It should be 
remembered that Congress is granted power "[t]o make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers [presumably the powers specifically enumerated in 
article I, section 8], and all other Powers vested by this Constitution 
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof.''131 The power to count electoral votes is a power 
vested in the President of the Senate and the members of both houses 
of Congress, all of whom are officers of the United States. Congress 
presumably legislated on this basis when it prescribed the procedures 
for resolution of the Hayes-Tilden controversy in 1876-1877,132 as 
well as in enacting its permanent rules pertaining to the counting of 
electoral votes.133 
Assuming some power of Congress over the procedures governing 
the count of electoral votes, does this power extend, beyond deter-
mining which of two contending slates of electors was validly chosen, 
to the question of how to count the vote of an elector whose right 
128. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § I. 
129. See text accompanying note 14 supra. 
130. U.S. CoNsr. art II, § I. 
131. U.S. CoNsr. art I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added). 
132. See note 113 supra. 
133. See note 114 supra. 
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to office is undisputed? Is there any basis for concluding that Con-
gress may prescribe that the vote of an unfaithful elector shall be 
counted as though he had voted for his party's candidate rather than 
as he actually voted? It may well be that whatever Congress does in 
this respect is immune from scrutiny by the courts.134 But Senators 
and Representatives, like judges, are bound by oath or affirmation 
to support the Constitution135 and should, and presumably would, 
act conscientiously in accordance with their conception of its re-
quirements. 
Even though the choice of electors is committed to the states, 
Congress has been held to have at least some power in this realm. 
In Ex Parte Yarbrough, 136 the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of nvo Reconstruction statutes punishing conspiracies to 
intimidate a person in the exercise of a constitutional right137 and 
conspiracies to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, a citizen 
entitled to vote from supporting a candidate for presidential elector 
or Congress.138 While the indictment in question involved only a 
congressional election and was based on intimidation of Negro vot-
ers-undoubtedly a special case under the fifteenth amendment-
the reasoning of the Court went much further: 
That a government whose essential character is republican, whose 
executive head and legislative body are both elective, whose most 
numerous and powerful branch of the legislature is elected by the 
people directly, has no power by appropriate laws to secure this 
election from the influence of violence, of corruption, and of fraud, 
is a proposition so startling as to arrest attention and demand the 
gravest consideration. 
If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation of 
delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which is 
superior to the general government, it must have the power to pro-
tect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and 
corruption . 
. . . [T]he importance to the general government of having the 
actual election-the voting for those members-free from force and 
fraud is not diminished by the circumstance that the qualification of 
the voter is determined by the law of the State where he votes. It 
equally affects the government, it is as indispensable to the proper 
discharge of the great function of legislating for that government, 
that those who are to control this legislation shall not owe their 
134. See text accompanying notes 110-24 supra. 
135. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
136. ll0 U.S. 651 (1884). 
1!17. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 116, § 6, 16 Stat. 141, the present equivalent of which 
is 18 u.s.c. § 241 (1964). 
138. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 14, which resembles the present 
18 u.s.c. § 594 (1964). 
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election to bribery or violence, whether the class of persons who 
shall vote is determined by the law of the State, or by law of the 
United States, or by their united result. 
In a republican government, like ours, where political power is 
reposed in representatives of the entire body of the people, chosen 
at short intervals by popular elections, the temptations to control 
these elections by violence and by corruption is a constant source 
of danger.139 
Again, in Burroughs v. United States,140 the Court upheld a pro-
vision of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925141 requiring any 
political committee accepting contributions or making expenditures 
in two or more states for the purpose of influencing the election of 
candidates for presidential elector to render certain financial reports. 
The Court stated: 
The congressional act under review seeks to preserve the purity 
of presidential and vice presidential elections. Neither in purpose 
nor in effect does it interfere with the power of a state to appoint 
electors or the manner in which their appointment shall be made. 
It deals with political committees organized for the purpose of influ-
encing elections in two or more states, and with branches or sub-
sidiaries of national committees, and excludes from its operation 
state or local committees. Its operation, therefore, is confined to 
situations which, if not beyond the power of the state to deal with 
at all, are beyond its power to deal with adequately. It in no sense 
invades any exclusive state power. 
While presidential electors are not officers or agents of the federal 
government (In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379), they exercise federal 
functions under, and discharge duties in virtue of authority con-
ferred by, the Constitution of the United States. The President is 
vested with the executive power of the nation. The importance of 
his election and the vital character of its relationship to and effect 
upon the welfare and safety of the whole people cannot be too 
strongly stated. To say that Congress is without power to pass appro-
priate legislation to safeguard such an election from the improper 
use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a 
vital particular the power of self protection. Congress, undoubtedly, 
possesses that power, as it possesses every other power essential to 
preserve the departments and institutions of the general government 
from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by 
corruption.142 
The Court has also held that Congress may make the miscounting 
of votes in congressional elections and primaries a federal crime.143 
While such cases rest upon the express grant of power to Congress 
139. ll0 U.S. at 657-58, 663, 666. 
140. 290 U.S. 534 (1934). 
141. 2 u.s.c. §§ 241-56 (1964). 
142. 290 U.S. at 544-45. 
143. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. !171 
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to regulate "the Times, Places and Manner of holding elections for 
Senators and Representatives, "144 and although there is no corre• 
sponding grant of power with respect to selection of electors, the in-
herent power of the federal government to protect the election of its 
officials from corruption, discussed in Yarbrough and Burroughs, 
would seem applicable where votes for presidential electors are 
fraudulently counted. 
But of what avail is it to be able to protect a voter against in-
terference with the casting or counting of his ballot in the first 
stage of the process-the choosing of electors-if Congress cannot 
ensure that his vote will be effective in the election of the President? 
It would of course be easier to sustain a federal statute punishing 
bribery of presidential electors designed to reverse the popular 
choice than it would be to uphold one punishing such an effort 
based on political persuasion. It would be still more difficult to 
uphold a statute which, in either circumstance, substituted for the 
electoral votes cast the votes which would have been cast if the 
electors had been faithful to their trust. (It would be easier to make 
bribery of a Senator a crime than to nullify, after the fact, the vote 
of a Senator who has been bribed.) Yet Congress might well conclude 
that the stakes in the choice of the President are sufficiently high 
that no criminal sanction consistent with the constitutional prohi-
bition of cruel and unusual punishment would deter an errant 
elector who had both the desire and the reason to believe that his 
vote might be decisive; nothing short of nullification of the unfaith-
ful vote would ensure the effectuation of the voters' wishes. Such 
a judgment on the part of Congress would seem well within the 
range of the necessary and proper clause.ms 
Such a statute need not ride completely roughshod over the 
power accorded the states to choose the means by which their 
electors are "appointed." If a state should choose to revert to the 
once-frequent practice of entrusting the choice of electors to its leg-
islature, or if its ballot should list only the names of the electors 
without those of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, 
the voters might not be deceived if an elector were to ignore his 
(1879). In United States v. Mosely, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915), Justice Holmes stated: "We 
regard it as equally unquestionable that the right to have one's vote counted is as 
open to protection by Congress as the right to put a ballot in the box." 
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
145. See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1934): 
The power of Congress to protect the election of President and Vice President 
from corruption being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question 
primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress. If it can be seen that the 
means adopted are really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their 
necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the closeness of the rela• 
tionship of the means adopted and the end to be attained, are matters for con-
gressional determination alone. 
36 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:1 
mandate; in either case there would perhaps be no authority for 
congressional interference.146 But where the ballot names the presi-
dential and vice-presidential candidates, a gross deception is prac-
ticed upon the voters if any of the chosen electors votes contrary to 
expectation. Would not the sanctity of the ballot be protected by 
legislation nullifying the vote of an unfaithful elector just as it is by 
legislation forbidding the miscounting of votes?147 Such legislation 
would be unconstitutional only if one reads into the constitutional 
provision empowering electors to choose the President a rigid rule 
that nothing may interfere with the electors' discretionary power. 
Legislation injected into so delicate an area as the choice of 
the President would be much more salutary if enacted to provide 
for future eventualities rather than directed to an existing election 
controversy. And if such a law were once enacted, it would be un-
fortunate for Congress to overturn it in order to favor one of 
several candidates in a specific controversy. Yet as matters now stand, 
such an eventuality is possible. The twentieth amendment provides 
that the new Congress shall take office on January 3, while a federal 
statute148 prescribes the counting of electoral votes on January 6; 
repeal or amendment of a previously enacted law to achieve ad hoc 
purposes would thus be conceivable between January 3 and 6. But 
the likelihood of obtaining acquiescence of both houses of Congress 
and the President ( or two-thirds of both houses without the Presi-
dent) in that short a time would be small indeed, especially at a 
time when, by hypothesis, a close presidential vote had just taken 
place. 
146. Cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); a state may be under no 
constitutional obligation to provide primary elections, but if it does they fall within 
the reach of congressional regulatory power. 
147. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment may serve as an alternative basis of 
congressional power. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Some doubt arises, 
however, as to which provision of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment Congress 
would be enforcing. If all voters are denied an effective vote for President, the equal 
protection clause may be inapplicable. The right to cast a meaningful vote, however, 
may be protected as a "liberty" under the due process clause. And, while there is no 
Supreme Court holding presently extant finding a violation of the privileges and 
immunities clause, the right to vote for President might fall within the test suggested 
in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873), as among those "which 
owe their existence to the Federal Government, its National character, its Constitu• 
tion, or its laws." But cf. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904). Perhaps an argument 
could also be based on the rights of citizenship conferred by the first sentence of the 
fourteenth amendment. Cf. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 166 (1964). In invalidating 
the Ohio laws that made it difficult for third-party candidates to appear on the ballot, 
the Supreme Court recently held that the equal protection clause protects "the right 
of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effec-
tively.'' Williams v. Rhodes, 37 U.S.L.W. 4001, 4003 (Oct. 15, 1968). 37 U.S.L.W. at 
4006. Whether it follows that the fourteenth amendment forbids breaches of faith 
by presidential electors, as a denial of the right to cast effective votes, a determination 
by Congress that such conduct violates the fourteenth amendment might be upheld. 
148. 3 u.s.c. § 15 (1964). 
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Assuming such a statute was not repealed, is there any assurance 
that Congress as legislature can bind Congress as vote-counter? Even 
if there were a law directing a count of electoral votes in accordance 
·with the voters' intentions, could the two houses, in joint session, 
nevertheless revert to counting the electoral votes as actually cast? 
Is there any way, short of a constitutional amendment dispensing 
with any action by the electors or Congress, for "Congress sober" 
to guard against "Congress drunk"? 
One possible solution is the inclusion in the statute of a pro-
vision for expedited judicial review of any action in the course of 
vote counting contrary to the statutory mandate. Original jurisdic-
tion (with appropriate enforcement power) could be vested in the 
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, perhaps a three-
judge court, with direct expedited appeal to the Supreme Court. 
I revert to the earlier discussion of whether questions pertaining 
to the counting of electoral votes are justiciable, or whether they fall 
instead into the "political question" category because they are re-
garded as entrusted by the Constitution to final determination by 
Congress.149 Suppose it is decided that these questions fall into the 
latter category, but Congress enacts legislation designed to confer 
upon the judiciary the authority, indeed the obligation, to pass 
upon them. Would such a jurisdictional grant be constitutional? 
Can Congress confer upon the judiciary a power to decide questions 
which, in the absence of such legislation, would be deemed inap-
propiate for judicial decision as "political" in nature? Is the "polit-
ical question" doctrine a constitutional command or merely a judi-
cially created rule of practice? 
This issue seems not to have come before the Supreme Court;150 
moreover, it may not be susceptible of a single answer. To the 
extent that the "political question" characterization reflects a de-
termination that the case involves issues or requires remedies so 
different from those usually considered by courts that the constitu-
149. See text accompanying notes 110-22 supra. 
150. An unsuccessful attempt to raise such an issue was made by appellants' counsel 
in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 
956 (1968). The Supreme Court had previously held that the "act of state" doctrine 
prevented the courts from examining the validity of certain acts of the Cuban 
Government. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The "Hicken-
looper Amendment," 22 U.S.C. §§ 2370(e){2) (Supp. III 1968) provided, in part, that 
"no court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state 
doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of 
international law ••. .'' On remand, the Banco Nacional de Cuba contended that this 
was an unconstitutional attempt to confer upon the courts jurisdiction over non-
justiciable questions. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted the 
Sabbatino decision as not based upon the Constitution, but as a choice "among a 
number of constitutionally permissible alternative rules" (383 F.2d at 181), and 
proceeded to apply the modifying statute. 
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tional requirement of "case or controversy"151 is lacking, no act of 
Congress can create jurisdiction.152 On the other hand, where a de-
cision of nonjusticiability is based on notions of convenience, pro-
priety, or deference to Congress not constitutionally compelled, 
Congress can presumably free the courts from their self-imposed ret-
icence.153 Much can be said for the conclusion that such legislation 
would be valid. A "judicially manageable standard" would have 
been provided, and a case or controversy-at least to the extent that 
there would be a real adversary proceeding leading to a final mean-
ingful judgment-would be present. Any qualms based upon the 
unseemliness and possible ineffectiveness of an attempt by the courts 
to give directions to Congress154 would be answered by reference 
to the fact that Congress itself had consented to the courts' action. 
In short, it would seem that there are a number of ways of 
coping with the problem of a "theft" of the presidency by indepen-
dent action on the part of the electors. This problem may be dealt 
with alone; it need not be part of an omnibus reform-such as the 
direct popular vote proposal-which would change the political 
balance of power in the country, possibly in a direction which 
would prove disastrous. The Court might hold electors bound to 
respect the choice of the voters without further legislation or consti-
tutional amendment; but we cannot be sure. A legislative solution 
is possible; but its effectiveness could never be completely free from 
doubt, and it is most important that any possibility of a disputed 
presidency be avoided. Such legislation might serve as a temporary 
expedient, however, pending adoption of a constitutional amend-
ment expressly removing the discretion of electors or, preferably, 
providing for counting electoral votes automatically. Thus, although 
changes in the present method of electing our Presidents are ur-
gently needed, an amendment providing for direct popular elec-
tion is neither the only, nor the best, solution. 
151. U.S. CoNsr. art. Ill, § 2. 
152. Cf. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). 
153. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). This may be true even 
if the bar to court action is found in the Constitution-not in the lack of a case or 
controversy under article m, but in the sense that the Constitution has conferred 
final decision-making power upon Congress. Conceivably, Congress might be deemed 
empowered to withdraw that barrier to court action. (This would clearly not be pos-
sible if the function involved were inherently of a nonjudicial nature, such as the 
determination whether to enact legislation or ratify a treaty; but it may be possible 
where the types of questions to be considered and relief requested are similar to those 
often coming before courts.) 
Perhaps there is an analogy to be found in the areas of state interference with 
interstate commerce and intergovernmental immunities: courts have held state action 
to violate the Constitution in the absence of congressional expression, but Congress 
may legislate to remove the barrier. Compare Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), with 
In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891). 
154. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 595-96 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (opinion of 
Burger, J.). 
